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Holding the Government to Account for its Finances:  





This paper describes the role and remit of the Scrutiny Unit, which assists Members of 
Parliament (MPs) with the analysis of accounting data. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
The analysis is developed through an understanding of the secondary literature and practical 
experience of the work of the Unit. 
 
Findings 
The Scrutiny Unit is an unappreciated and yet vital part of the way in which financial scrutiny 
operates within the UK Parliament. It translates to MPs key financial and economic documents 
including the budget and accounts. It is a unique institution, covering the entire financial cycle 
of approval and accountability within Parliament.  
 
Originality 
This is the first descriptive piece on the Unit in an accounting journal and contributes to our 
understanding of how financial accountability works within the UK Parliament. 
 






The Scrutiny Unit at the House of Commons in the UK provides select committees and 
members of the UK Parliament with support and advice to enable them to interpret, analyse 
and scrutinise financial information published by the Government. The Unit also offers other 
services to the House including assisting with the scrutiny of draft bills and coordinating the 
evidence collection of Public Bill Committees. In this article, we focus on the Unit’s financial 
duties and its role in assisting Members of Parliament (MPs) in holding the Government to 
account. The Unit has a small number of staff but is crucially important to the ability of 
Parliament to perform its role in holding the Government to account. In this article, we describe 
how the Scrutiny Unit functions and what it does, against the background of calls within the 
literature for further analysis of the reception of financial information (Santis et al., 2018, p. 
243). We conclude by suggesting that analysis of the function and role of the Unit indicates 
further areas for research in the way that democratic financial accountability within and outside 
the UK functions. 
 
The role of Parliament with regard to finance 
 
Democratic accountability rests upon accountability for finance (Dewar and Funnell, 2017, p. 
1; Ferry et al., 2015). It is widely accepted, despite some recent populist challenges (Muller, 
2016 pp. 60-68), democratic government does not solely rest in the election of a government 
but also is a procedural form of government wherein constitutional rules and norms restrict a 
government’s competence to act. One of the most important of those norms is the financial 
accountability of the executive to the legislature or the people. The principle that taxation can 
only be raised with the consent of the taxed is central to many democratic constitutions. Once 
Governments recognised that they could only raise taxation by consent, they moved quickly to 
recognise that the electorate or legislature had a right to examine the way in which the money 
raised was spent. In modern representative democracies, this relationship still holds, and it is 
the legislature which assumes the duty of holding the Government to account.  
 
Parliamentary accountability for finance is a key and ancient principle of the UK constitution. 
The principle that the consent of the electorate is required for taxation to be levied goes back 
hundreds of years. The idea that only Parliament can grant the right to spend money to the 
Government goes back to the 1690s. Over time, this has evolved into a principle that Parliament 
has the right to approve the way that Government allocates money (with limited rights to 
change how the Government has done this) and has the right to scrutinise that allocation. 
Parliamentary scrutiny of how that money is spent dates, in its modern form, to the 1860s when 
the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gladstone created the Public Accounts Committee, the 
Exchequer and Audit Department (the forerunner of today’s National Audit Office (NAO)) and 
the infrastructure of accounts that the UK still has today. Currently these three separate types 
of authority are displayed through three separate Parliamentary processes being the Budget and 
associated Finance Act which authorise taxation, the Estimates and associated Supply and 
Appropriation Act which authorise spending and the Accounts (which enable the process of 
scrutiny). These processes roughly coincide with what Ferry and Eckersley (2011, 2012, 2015, 
2019) describe as the four acts of financial control in central and local government relations 
being the spending review, budget, audit and accountability, and risk management 
arrangements. Prior to the Estimates, the Government also publishes multi-year Spending 
Reviews: whilst not formally approved by the House, they may be scrutinised by it, although 
the degree to which this happens in practice can vary considerably. In the UK Parliament, these 
scrutiny processes involve both the Chamber of the House of Commons and its specialist select 
committees. The Budget and Estimates are approved by the Chamber. The Estimates and 
Accounts are scrutinised within the departmental select committees (and occasionally, in the 
case of the accounts, within the Public Accounts Committee) and the Treasury Committee often 
holds a hearing on the Budget documents soon after they are published. Scrutiny has 
contemporary relevance too. There is plenty of scholarship on the importance of financial 
scrutiny against the context of public expenditure policy after the 2008 financial crisis (Ferry 
and Murphy, 2015; Barbara et al., 2017; Murphy et al., 2019). Financial scrutiny’s political 
importance has risen recently due to the response to the COVID pandemic (Ahrens and Ferry, 
2020, Heald and Hodges 2020). Financial scrutiny therefore plays both a crucial constitutional 
role and an important part within current political discourse. 
 
The scrutiny of finances creates difficulties for MPs, as the documents concerned are incredibly 
technical and aspire to meeting best professional standards (Hyndman et al., 2017, p. 1386). 
For example, the Budget documents use economic analysis to underpin their forecasts (since 
2010 provided by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR)). The Estimates use 
a set template and are normally published twice a year, once when the Government requests 
initial funding and secondly when the Government requests a top up (or reduction) in funding 
(the supplementary estimates before the year-end). The Accounts used within the UK are now 
drawn up according to International Financial Reporting Standards. The documents are long, 
being often hundreds of pages in length in the case of the Estimates and Accounts. There have 
been numerous calls for them to be made shorter and more accessible for MPs but there are 
inescapable complexities involved in publishing financial information for the entire public 
sector. Outside organisations do assist Parliament in their work scrutinising these documents. 
The OBR compiles economic forecasts consistent with Budget. The NAO publishes 
Departmental Overviews that summarise the main information in the annual reports and 
accounts and other information revealed through the NAO’s value for money reports (Midgley, 
2019, p. 789). However, the technical challenge for MPs remains a large one. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that most of the staff working for select committees are either experts 
in the procedure of the House of Commons or subject matter experts, rather than having 
expertise in public finance or economics. Select Committees do employ advisors from outside 
(for example, from academia and/or the finance industry) either for specific inquiries and/or to 
assist with an entire area of work: but the access they have to these advisors is ad hoc and varies 
in effectiveness. 
 
The Scrutiny Unit and MPs 
 
The Scrutiny Unit was created in 2001 to fill the gap around scrutiny of finances (Midgley, 
2019, p. 790). The Scrutiny Unit’s finance team comprises a small group of qualified 
accountants, economists and data visualizers employed to assist the Committees and the 
Commons in their scrutiny of Government financial information. The Unit provides two forms 
of support to the Commons: firstly, they provide regular support on the main fiscal events of 
the year and secondly, they provide one off support to select committees where and as required. 
In doing this, the Unit provides analysis of financial and statistical information. For example, 
the Unit’s staff examine both accounting data (presented in the Annual Reports and Accounts), 
statistical data (presented in the Public Expenditure data published by the Office for National 
Statistics) and economic data (presented in the annual budget).  
 
The first form of support includes providing briefing to select committees on the Spending 
Review, Budget, Estimates and Accounts. The Unit supports the scrutiny of the Spending 
Review by providing briefing to select committees about the impact of it on their departments. 
The Unit also provide similar briefings to select committees on the impact of the Budget on 
their departments. The Unit provides briefing to all MPs in advance of debates on the Main and 
Supplementary Estimates each year. This briefing covers the entirety of the Estimates 
published by the Government, plus more detailed briefing on the particular Estimates selected 
by the Backbench Business Committee for debate within the Commons. Each Estimate is also 
scrutinised by the relevant departmental select committee, with committees often following up 
on spending issues relevant to Estimates through correspondence with the department. The 
Unit supports committees in this through oral briefings, data visualisations, drafting letters to 
departments and explaining and considering the responses which Committees receive. The Unit 
provides major support to the departmental committees in advance of their annual hearings on 
the departmental annual reports and accounts. The Unit therefore supports the parliamentary 
cycle of financial approval and reporting at every point.   
 
Secondly, the Unit Staff also assist the Commons by providing ad hoc expertise to select 
committees when committees require financial or economic skills. For instance in recent years 
the unit has provided support for committee inquiries into health spending, local government 
sustainability, the demise of Thomas Cook (a large British global travel and tourism business), 
international aid and many others. The unit also gets involved in analysing and interpreting 
performance and non-financial statistical information, and assisting Committees to understand 
the value for money and effectiveness of spending programmes. Support can take the form of 
producing briefings, explaining background, suggesting questions for committees to ask and 
drafting parts of committee reports. The Unit is also heavily involved in inquiries focussed 
predominately on the financial accountability of Government to Parliament, such as the Liaison 
Committee’s 2009 work on financial accountability, the Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affair’s Committee’s (PACAC) work on accounts and the Procedure 
Committee’s recent work on Estimates and a proposed Commons Budget Committee1. Staff 
from the Unit have also assisted in the production of more general briefings sometimes working 
in conjunction with the House of Commons Library, for example on the financing of Heathrow 
Airport or local government.2  
 
In addition to support to the House of Commons itself, the Unit supports the House by 
promoting financial accountability outside of Parliament. Within the UK the head of the Unit’s 
finance team sits on the Financial Reporting Advisory Board that helps the Treasury administer 
the introduction of new standards into the UK public sector financial accounting; and assisted 
the Treasury’s recent review of financial reporting across government.3 The Unit also enjoys 
strong ties with its counterparts in the devolved Parliaments of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland within the UK. The Unit represents the UK Parliament at international fora concerning 
financial accountability and enjoys strong links with bodies such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development who also promote financial accountability. The 
Unit’s wider work in promoting financial accountability also takes in promoting financial 
information to the public through the publication of data visualisations for the Estimates and 
Spending Reviews.4 
 
The function of the Unit: obscure but important 
 
The role of the Scrutiny Unit has not been described in the accounting literature, as far as we 
know, and academic references have been passing (e.g. Midgley, 2019 p. 790), but it lies at the 
centre of the system of financial accountability in the UK. Understanding the Unit’s place in 
the system has become more important. This is because some of the fundamental axioms of 
financial accountability are being challenged, for example, through the Procedure Committee’s 
embrace of a Parliamentary Budget Committee. In addition, the Government has acknowledged 
the need for change both to the Estimates process by allowing more debate of the estimates and 
to the way that accounts are published through embedding PACAC’s principles in guidance.  
 
The Unit’s function is primarily one of translation. It translates the technical financial, 
economic and statistical data received by Parliament into a form that members of the House of 
Commons and their select committees can use. Some other bodies provide similar services such 
as the NAO through their departmental overviews, but the Unit’s position within the House 
Service and its function across the whole of the spending cycle make it unique. The importance 
of the Unit points to several gaps in the current literature on democratic accountability. The 
first is that whereas the accounting literature concentrates on accounting data, the Unit’s remit 
spreads across both accounting and non-accounting statistical data and it uses both to help MPs 
hold the Government to account. The second is that whereas the literature focuses on the 
preparation of accounts and their audit by Supreme Audit Institutions, it does not focus on the 








way in which that information needs to be sifted, interpreted and explained before elected 
representatives can use it. The Scrutiny Unit’s importance within the parliamentary scrutiny of 
financial information suggests that both these questions require further examination in the 
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